Mehri Madarshahi｜能源安全、中美地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與氣候承諾的弱化

IPP評(píng)論是國(guó)家高端智庫(kù)華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺(tái)

導(dǎo)語(yǔ)：隨著伊朗戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)引發(fā)的石油危機(jī)導(dǎo)致眾多國(guó)家和地區(qū)的能源安全受到威脅，全球正愈發(fā)清晰地意識(shí)到：能源問(wèn)題早已深深嵌入地緣政治邏輯之中。

IPP榮譽(yù)教授梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）發(fā)文指出，全球能源轉(zhuǎn)型正日益受到地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和能源安全擔(dān)憂的制約。雖然《巴黎協(xié)定》為去碳化創(chuàng)造了動(dòng)力，但烏克蘭、波斯灣和霍爾木茲海峽的戰(zhàn)事與動(dòng)蕩，重新喚起了化石燃料的戰(zhàn)略重要性。隨著各國(guó)政府將確保供應(yīng)安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定列為優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)，氣候方面的承諾在實(shí)際操作中遭到了削弱。

文章將這一轉(zhuǎn)變與美國(guó)與中國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)系起來(lái)，指出在能源控制領(lǐng)域，化石燃料的主導(dǎo)地位與可再生能源的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位構(gòu)成了兩種相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的權(quán)力來(lái)源。歐洲的能源脆弱性表明，氣候方面的雄心壯志有可能被重新導(dǎo)向?qū)剂系囊蕾嚒Ｎ恼伦詈缶娣Q，如果這一過(guò)渡過(guò)程淪為大國(guó)角力的又一舞臺(tái)，那么它很可能會(huì)遭到拖延和扭曲。

Energy Security, U.S.–China Geopolitical Rivalry, and the Erosion of Climate Commitments

能源安全、中美地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與氣候承諾的弱化

本文作者：Mehri Madarshahi（梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希）

IPP榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織下屬國(guó)際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)成員

Phil Noble / 路透社

《巴黎協(xié)定》標(biāo)志著全球在氣候變化問(wèn)題上罕見地形成了一次共識(shí)。幾乎所有國(guó)家，包括美國(guó)和中國(guó)，首次共同承諾加入一個(gè)旨在減少溫室氣體排放、限制全球變暖的框架之中。該協(xié)定確立了一個(gè)共同方向，即逐步向低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型，推進(jìn)減排目標(biāo)和凈零目標(biāo)，并維持持續(xù)性的多邊合作。

The Paris Agreement marked a rare moment of global alignment on climate change. For the first time, nearly all states, including the United States and China committed to a common framework aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and limiting global warming. The agreement established a shared direction focus on the gradual transition toward low-carbon economies, emissions reductions, net-zero targets, and sustained multilateral cooperation.

在隨后的幾年里，這一承諾又得到一系列趨同趨勢(shì)的強(qiáng)化。各國(guó)政府相繼出臺(tái)更加雄心勃勃的氣候政策，金融市場(chǎng)開始將環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)納入投資決策，可再生能源在多個(gè)地區(qū)快速部署。圍繞全球能源體系可以逐步轉(zhuǎn)型、2020年至2030年將是加速這一轉(zhuǎn)型的決定性十年，各方逐漸形成了廣泛共識(shí)。

In the years that followed, this commitment was reinforced by a series of converging developments. Governments adopted increasingly ambitious climate policies, financial markets began integrating environmental criteria into investment decisions, and renewable energy expanded rapidly across multiple regions. A broad consensus emerged around the idea that the global energy system could be progressively transformed, and that the decade between 2020 and 2030 would be decisive in accelerating this transition.

然而，這一勢(shì)頭后來(lái)被證明比最初設(shè)想的更加脆弱。自2022年以來(lái)，一系列地緣政治沖擊打斷了《巴黎協(xié)定》后形成的轉(zhuǎn)型軌跡。大規(guī)模沖突的回歸，尤其是俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭之后，使能源安全重新成為政策制定者關(guān)注的核心問(wèn)題。霍爾木茲海峽等關(guān)鍵能源通道的不穩(wěn)定局勢(shì)進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了這一轉(zhuǎn)向；相關(guān)緊張形勢(shì)凸顯出全球石油供應(yīng)的脆弱性。

Yet this momentum has proven more fragile than initially assumed. Since 2022, a series of geopolitical shocks has disrupted the trajectory set in motion after Paris. The return of large-scale conflict, most notably following theRussian invasion of Ukraine, reintroduced energy security as a central concern for policymakers. This shift was further reinforced by instability in key energy corridors, including the Strait of Hormuz, where tensions have underscored the vulnerability of global oil supply.

這些變化已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了切實(shí)后果。各國(guó)政府推遲或修訂了脫碳時(shí)間表，擴(kuò)大了對(duì)化石燃料基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的投資，并將供應(yīng)安全置于長(zhǎng)期氣候目標(biāo)之上。因此，盡管《巴黎協(xié)定》框架下的正式承諾依然存在，但其對(duì)政策和市場(chǎng)行為的實(shí)際影響力已經(jīng)減弱。

These developments have had tangible consequences. Governments have delayed or revised decarbonization timelines, expanded investment in fossil fuel infrastructure, and prioritized supply security over long-term climate objectives.Thus, while the formal commitments of the Paris framework remain in place, their practical influence on policy and market behavior have weakened.

今天正在出現(xiàn)的，并不是“后巴黎時(shí)代”能源轉(zhuǎn)型的簡(jiǎn)單延續(xù)，而是一幅更加復(fù)雜、更加碎片化的圖景。氣候目標(biāo)仍然是一個(gè)重要參照，但它們?cè)絹?lái)越多地需要與地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定和能源安全等考量相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并且往往被置于這些考量之下。全球能源轉(zhuǎn)型曾被視為一項(xiàng)協(xié)調(diào)一致的共同努力，如今卻正在戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和系統(tǒng)性緊張的條件下展開。

Today, what is emerging is not a straightforward continuation of the post-Paris transition, but a more complex and fragmented landscape. Climate goals persist as a reference point, yet they increasingly compete with and are often subordinated to, considerations of geopolitical rivalry, economic stability, and energy security. The global energy transition, once framed as a coordinated effort, is now unfolding under conditions of strategic competition and systemic tension.

4月17日，俄羅斯克拉斯諾達(dá)爾邊疆區(qū)圖阿普謝發(fā)生烏克蘭襲擊事件，導(dǎo)致石油泄漏到黑海。圖源：路透社

從氣候行動(dòng)勢(shì)頭到戰(zhàn)略性逆轉(zhuǎn)

From Climate Momentum to Strategic Reversal

然而，“后巴黎時(shí)代”轉(zhuǎn)型軌跡的中斷并不是在某一個(gè)瞬間突然發(fā)生的，而是在地緣政治沖擊觸發(fā)之下，各項(xiàng)優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)迅速重新排序的結(jié)果。原本，人們期待2020年至2030年這十年將以加速脫碳為主要特征；但這種期待正越來(lái)越多地讓位于一種更加復(fù)雜的現(xiàn)實(shí)：能源安全、經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定和戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)開始發(fā)揮決定性作用。

The disruption of the post-Paris trajectory did not,however, occur in a single moment, but through a rapid reordering of priorities triggered by geopolitical shocks. The expectation that the 2020–2030 decade would be defined by accelerated decarbonization has increasingly given way to a more complex reality in which energy security, economic stability, and strategic competition play a determining role.

俄烏沖突成為一個(gè)關(guān)鍵轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)。它暴露出能源供應(yīng)體系的脆弱性，尤其是在歐洲，迫使各國(guó)政府重新評(píng)估能源轉(zhuǎn)型的速度與結(jié)構(gòu)。重新啟用煤炭、擴(kuò)建液化天然氣基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、推動(dòng)供應(yīng)來(lái)源多元化等應(yīng)急措施，都反映出政策重心正在緊急轉(zhuǎn)向確保眼前的能源需求。

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a critical inflection point. By exposing the vulnerability of energy supply systems-particularly in Europe-it forced governments to reassess the pace and structure of the energy transition. Emergency measures, including the reactivation of coal, the expansion of liquefied natural gas infrastructure, and the diversification of supply sources, reflected an urgent shift toward securing immediate energy needs.

這種重新校準(zhǔn)并不局限于歐洲。它標(biāo)志著政策制定層面出現(xiàn)了更廣泛的轉(zhuǎn)變：長(zhǎng)期氣候目標(biāo)開始被置于短期安全與韌性需求之下加以權(quán)衡。市場(chǎng)也同步作出反應(yīng)，重新加大對(duì)化石燃料生產(chǎn)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的投資，從而進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了這一趨勢(shì)。

This recalibration was not limited to Europe. It signaled a broader transformation in policymaking, where long-term climate objectives began to be weighed against short-term imperatives of security and resilience. Markets responded in parallel, with renewed investment in fossil fuel production and infrastructure, further reinforcing this trend.

近來(lái)，霍爾木茲海峽等關(guān)鍵能源通道周邊的不穩(wěn)定局勢(shì)進(jìn)一步放大了這些壓力。石油市場(chǎng)的波動(dòng)，以及維持供應(yīng)不中斷所具有的戰(zhàn)略重要性，使化石燃料在各國(guó)決策中的地位持續(xù)上升。

More recently, instability surrounding critical energy corridors such as theStrait of Hormuz has amplified these pressures. Volatility in oil markets and the strategic importance of maintaining uninterrupted supply have continued to elevate the role of fossil fuels in national decision-making.

然而必須強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，盡管氣候承諾在形式上依然存在，其實(shí)際操作意義已經(jīng)明顯下降。正在出現(xiàn)的并不是既有進(jìn)程的延續(xù)，而是一種優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)的重新排序：能源安全正越來(lái)越多地壓倒脫碳目標(biāo)。

What must be emphasized, however, is that while climate commitments remain formally in place, their operational significance has been markedly reduced. What is emerging is not continuity, but a reordering of priorities in which energy security increasingly overrides decarbonization goals.

綜合來(lái)看，這些發(fā)展指向的不是暫時(shí)偏離，而是一場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)性轉(zhuǎn)變。在一個(gè)日益碎片化的國(guó)際體系中，能源轉(zhuǎn)型正在被地緣政治現(xiàn)實(shí)重新塑造，并在某些情況下受到限制。

Taken together, these developments point to a structural shift rather than a temporary deviation. This energy transition is being reshaped and in some cases constrained, by the geopolitical realities of an increasingly fragmented international system.

在中東局勢(shì)導(dǎo)致能源緊張的背景下，歐盟委員會(huì)22日公布名為 “加速歐盟” 的行動(dòng)方案，旨在減輕能源價(jià)格飆升對(duì)歐洲家庭和企業(yè)造成的沖擊，推動(dòng)歐盟邁向 “能源獨(dú)立”。圖源：Getty Images

化石燃料“權(quán)力”的延續(xù)與擴(kuò)張

The Persistence and Expansion of Fossil Fuel Power

與關(guān)于能源轉(zhuǎn)型有序推進(jìn)的主流敘事相反，化石燃料不僅仍然處于全球能源結(jié)構(gòu)的中心位置，而且深深嵌入主要大國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略計(jì)算之中。石油和天然氣繼續(xù)作為地緣政治影響力的工具發(fā)揮作用，既塑造著國(guó)際關(guān)系的運(yùn)行方式，也影響著全球市場(chǎng)的結(jié)構(gòu)。

Contrary to prevailing narratives of an orderly energy transition, fossil fuels remain not only central to the global energy mix but also deeply embedded in the strategic calculations of major powers. Oil and gas continue to function as instruments of geopolitical influence, shaping both the conduct of international relations and the structure of global markets.

近期發(fā)展表明，化石燃料權(quán)力的延續(xù)并不只是慣性或政策調(diào)整遲緩的結(jié)果。相反，它反映出一種更具“主動(dòng)性”的模式：對(duì)能源資源和供應(yīng)通道的控制，已經(jīng)構(gòu)成戰(zhàn)略行為的核心要素。在這一背景下，化石燃料并不是即將被逐步淘汰的普通商品，而是需要被管理、被保障，并在可能情況下被加以利用的戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)。

Recent developments suggest that this persistence is not merely the result of inertia or slow policy adaptation. Rather, it reflects a more deliberate pattern in which control over energy resources and supply routes constitutes a core element of strategic behavior. In this context, fossil fuels are not simply commodities to be phased out, but assets to be managed, secured, and, where possible, leveraged.

不同年份全球石油總需求月度走勢(shì)，單位為百萬(wàn)桶/日。圖源：IEA

委內(nèi)瑞拉和波斯灣等地區(qū)的動(dòng)態(tài)變化，正體現(xiàn)了這一模式。主要產(chǎn)油國(guó)的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)變化，推動(dòng)其能源部門重新組織，使外部力量得以在新的條件下重新接觸相關(guān)儲(chǔ)備，并促使這些資源重新融入全球市場(chǎng)。與此同時(shí)，霍爾木茲海峽等關(guān)鍵運(yùn)輸節(jié)點(diǎn)周邊緊張局勢(shì)加劇，也凸顯出控制能源生產(chǎn)本身之外，控制能源流動(dòng)同樣重要。綜合來(lái)看，這些發(fā)展指向一種雙重戰(zhàn)略：在政治上相互靠近的背景下擴(kuò)大供應(yīng)，在敵對(duì)關(guān)系中限制或擾亂供應(yīng)。

The evolving dynamics in regions such as Venezuela and the Persian Gulf illustrate this pattern. Political and economic shifts in major oil-producing states have facilitated the reorganization of their energy sectors, enabling renewed access to reserves and their reintegration into global markets under altered conditions. At the same time, heightened tensions around critical transit points such as the Strait of Hormuz underscore the importance of controlling not only production, but also the flow of energy. Together, these developments point to a dual strategy: the expansion of supply in politically aligned contexts, and the restriction or disruption of supply in adversarial ones.

航運(yùn)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，委內(nèi)瑞拉3月石油日出口量突破100萬(wàn)桶大關(guān)。圖源：路透社

這種雙重性表明，在更廣泛的權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)中，石油發(fā)揮著戰(zhàn)略杠桿的作用。它不僅使國(guó)家能夠保障自身能源需求，也使其能夠影響全球定價(jià)、市場(chǎng)穩(wěn)定，以及其他行為體開展活動(dòng)時(shí)所處的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件。從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，對(duì)化石燃料體系的管理，已經(jīng)與地緣政治權(quán)力的行使密不可分。

This duality suggests that oil functions as a strategic lever within a broader architecture of power. It enables states not only to secure their own energy needs but also to influence global pricing, market stability, and the economic conditions under which other actors operate. In this sense, the management of fossil fuel systems becomes inseparable from the exercise of geopolitical power.

重要的是，這一動(dòng)態(tài)必須放在大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇的背景下理解，尤其是中美競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不斷加劇的背景下。獲取能源資源、控制供應(yīng)鏈，正日益同更廣泛的戰(zhàn)略關(guān)切交織在一起，其中包括技術(shù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)、工業(yè)能力和全球影響力。因此，影響主要產(chǎn)油地區(qū)的行動(dòng)，其意義已經(jīng)超出眼前的資源考量，并會(huì)塑造競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手追求其經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治目標(biāo)時(shí)所處的戰(zhàn)略環(huán)境。

Importantly, this dynamic must be understood within the coext of intensifying great-power competition, particularly between the United States and China. Access to energy resources and control over supply chains are increasingly intertwined with broader strategic concerns, including technological leadership, industrial capacity, and global influence. Actions affecting major oil-producing regions therefore have implications that extend beyond immediate resource considerations, shaping the strategic environment in which rivals pursue their economic and political objectives.

其結(jié)果是一種結(jié)構(gòu)性悖論：盡管全球話語(yǔ)仍在強(qiáng)調(diào)脫碳，但能源安全與大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的地緣政治邏輯，卻進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了化石燃料的中心地位，并使其被重新工具化——它們不再只是能源來(lái)源，也成為在日益激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的國(guó)際體系中進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略布局的工具。

The result is a structural paradox. While global discourse continues to emphasize decarbonization, the geopolitical logic of energy security and competition reinforces the centrality of fossil fuels, re-instrumentalizing it, not only as sources of energy, but as tools of strategic positioning in an increasingly contested international system.

中東戰(zhàn)事導(dǎo)致霍爾木茲海峽航運(yùn)阻斷，嚴(yán)重影響波斯灣的石油運(yùn)輸，亞洲與歐洲國(guó)家紛紛轉(zhuǎn)向美國(guó)尋找替代貨源。圖源：Getty Images

能源轉(zhuǎn)型，還是能源圍困？

Energy Transition or Energy Siege?

如果說(shuō)能源安全已經(jīng)成為氣候行動(dòng)倒退的一個(gè)驅(qū)動(dòng)因素，那么更深層的問(wèn)題在于，為什么這種模式會(huì)如此持久，并且在政治上如此難以逆轉(zhuǎn)。答案并不僅僅在于市場(chǎng)慣性或制度乏力，而在于一場(chǎng)日益塑造能源秩序本身的地緣政治斗爭(zhēng)。乍看之下，這似乎是短期供應(yīng)需求與長(zhǎng)期氣候目標(biāo)之間的沖突；但實(shí)際上，它嵌入了一場(chǎng)更廣泛的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)之中，關(guān)乎權(quán)力、戰(zhàn)略杠桿，以及對(duì)全球能源體系的控制。

If energy security has become a driver of climate backsliding, the deeper question is why this pattern has become so persistent and so politically difficult to reverse. The answer lies not only in market inertia or institutional weakness, but in the geopolitical struggle increasingly shaping the energy order itself. What appears at first glance to be a clash between short-term supply needs and long-term climate goals is, in reality, embedded in a broader contest over power, strategic leverage, and the control of global energy systems.

正因如此，我們不能簡(jiǎn)單地將當(dāng)下理解為一個(gè)不同國(guó)家各自追求不同發(fā)展路徑的時(shí)期。問(wèn)題不僅僅在于，中國(guó)和美國(guó)正在沿著不同的能源模式前進(jìn)，而這些模式原則上可以并行共存。更深層的現(xiàn)實(shí)是，這些模式正在發(fā)生碰撞。

This is why the present moment cannot be understood simply as a period in which different states are pursuing different developmental pathways. The issue is not merely that China and the United States are advancing through distinct energy models that might, in principle, coexist side by side. The deeper reality is that these models are colliding.

中國(guó)在可再生能源、電池、電動(dòng)汽車和清潔能源制造領(lǐng)域的崛起，并不只是一個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)故事，更是一個(gè)地緣政治故事。它預(yù)示著一種未來(lái)的出現(xiàn)：戰(zhàn)略影響力可能不再主要取決于對(duì)傳統(tǒng)化石資源的控制，而越來(lái)越取決于在電氣化技術(shù)、供應(yīng)鏈和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施中的主導(dǎo)地位。這一轉(zhuǎn)變將對(duì)全球權(quán)力格局產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)影響。

China’s rise in renewables, batteries, electric vehicles, and clean-energy manufacturing is not only an industrial story; it is a geopolitical one. It suggests the emergence of a future in which strategic influence may depend less on traditional control of fossil resources and more on dominance in the technologies, supply chains, and infrastructures of electrification. That shift has profound implications for global power.

新疆吐魯番市鄯善縣1GW“光熱+光伏”一體化項(xiàng)目。圖源：新華社

正是這一轉(zhuǎn)變，進(jìn)一步凸顯了當(dāng)今能源安全問(wèn)題核心處的矛盾。對(duì)美國(guó)而言，能源長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)不僅關(guān)乎繁榮，也與戰(zhàn)略準(zhǔn)則、全球投射能力和體系性影響力緊密相連。自21世紀(jì)初以來(lái)，美國(guó)安全思維反復(fù)將對(duì)主要能源生產(chǎn)地區(qū)、運(yùn)輸通道和海上咽喉要道的進(jìn)入與影響，視為其全球主導(dǎo)地位的重要組成部分。在這一框架下，化石能源并不只是商品，而是一種杠桿：它可以被保護(hù)、被制裁、被改道、被扣留，也可以被用來(lái)強(qiáng)化聯(lián)盟和依賴關(guān)系。隨著“轉(zhuǎn)型”話語(yǔ)興起，這一邏輯并未消失。恰恰相反，它仍在塑造美國(guó)權(quán)力更深層的戰(zhàn)略反射。

It is precisely this shift that sharpens the contradiction at the heart of energy security today. For the United States, energy has long been tied not only to prosperity, but to strategic doctrine, global reach, and systemic influence. Since the early 2000s, American security thinking has repeatedly treated access to and influence over major energy-producing regions, transport corridors, and maritime chokepoints as integral to its global primacy. In that framework, fossil energy is not merely a commodity, it is a source of leverage: something that can be protected, sanctioned, rerouted, withheld, or used to reinforce alliances and dependencies. This logic has not disappeared with the language of transition. On the contrary, it continues to shape the deeper strategic reflexes of U.S. power.

也正因如此，這場(chǎng)沖突遠(yuǎn)比單純圍繞能源選擇的分歧更加嚴(yán)重。一個(gè)堅(jiān)定走向可再生能源、電氣化和更加分布式生產(chǎn)體系的世界，不僅會(huì)改變排放軌跡，也可能削弱美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期依賴的化石燃料架構(gòu)在地緣政治中的中心地位。它將把競(jìng)爭(zhēng)場(chǎng)域轉(zhuǎn)向中國(guó)已經(jīng)取得顯著優(yōu)勢(shì)的領(lǐng)域。從這一角度看，問(wèn)題便不再只是環(huán)境問(wèn)題。能源轉(zhuǎn)型本身成為一個(gè)戰(zhàn)略問(wèn)題。氣候科學(xué)并不一定會(huì)被直接、統(tǒng)一地否認(rèn)；相反，每當(dāng)其政策含義可能加速一種不利于華盛頓的權(quán)力再分配時(shí)，它就會(huì)被擱置到一旁。

That is why the conflict is more serious than a simple disagreement over energy choices. A world moving decisively toward renewable energy, electrification, and more distributed systems of production would not only alter emissions trajectories; it could also reduce the geopolitical centrality of the fossil-fuel architecture on which American power has long relied. It would shift the terrain of competition toward sectors in which China has already gained significant advantage. Seen from that perspective, the issue is no longer merely environmental. The transition itself becomes a strategic problem. Climate science is not necessarily denied in a direct or uniform way; rather, it is displaced whenever its implications threaten to accelerate a redistribution of power unfavorable to Washington.

這有助于解釋，為什么即便面對(duì)氣候危險(xiǎn)的壓倒性證據(jù)，對(duì)能源安全的追求仍常常會(huì)強(qiáng)化對(duì)化石燃料的依賴。問(wèn)題并不只是各國(guó)政府行動(dòng)遲緩、前后不一或言行不符，而是化石能源仍然提供著可再生能源體系尚未完全復(fù)制的戰(zhàn)略效用。石油和天然氣依然同航運(yùn)通道、軍事保護(hù)、地區(qū)影響、制裁機(jī)制、定價(jià)權(quán)和脅迫外交緊密相連。它們深深嵌入舊有的地緣政治語(yǔ)法之中。可再生能源或許承諾了更高的可持續(xù)性，但它并不會(huì)自動(dòng)提供同樣一套由咽喉要道和控制權(quán)構(gòu)成的權(quán)力架構(gòu)。對(duì)于習(xí)慣于以控制、稀缺和杠桿來(lái)思考問(wèn)題的國(guó)家而言，這一點(diǎn)極其重要。

This helps explain why the pursuit of energy security so often reinforces fossil dependence even in the face of overwhelming evidence about climate danger. It is not simply that governments are slow, inconsistent, or hypocritical. It is that fossil energy still offers forms of strategic utility that renewable systems do not yet fully replicate. Oil and gas remain tied to shipping lanes, military protection, territorial influence, sanctions regimes, pricing power, and coercive diplomacy. They are deeply embedded in the older grammar of geopolitics. Renewables may promise greater sustainability, but they do not automatically provide the same architecture of chokepoints and command. For states accustomed to thinking in terms of control, scarcity, and leverage, this matters enormously.

烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)將這一矛盾充分暴露出來(lái)。一場(chǎng)最初表現(xiàn)為軍事和領(lǐng)土層面的沖突，很快揭示出能源在地緣政治秩序中的持久中心地位。歐洲與俄羅斯天然氣脫鉤，確實(shí)加快了尋找替代方案的步伐，也強(qiáng)化了擴(kuò)大可再生能源的政治理由。但與此同時(shí)，它也加深了歐洲在短期內(nèi)對(duì)替代性化石能源供應(yīng)的依賴，尤其是對(duì)液化天然氣、應(yīng)急合同以及安全獲取能源資源的激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的依賴。從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)并不只是擾亂了舊有能源秩序；它重新激活了這一秩序最深層的邏輯。供應(yīng)安全再次壓倒了氣候政策的一致性，能源轉(zhuǎn)型的政治議程也在戰(zhàn)略緊迫性的壓力下被迫后退。

The war in Ukraine brought this contradiction into full view. What began as a military and territorial conflict quickly exposed the enduring centrality of energy to geopolitical order. Europe’s rupture with Russian gas did accelerate the search for alternatives and strengthen the political case for renewable expansion. But it also deepened the short-term reliance on alternative fossil supplies, especially liquefied natural gas, emergency contracts, and intensified competition for secure access. In this sense, the Ukraine war did not simply disrupt the old energy order; it reactivated its deepest logic. Supply security once again overrode climate coherence, and the politics of transition were pushed back under the pressure of strategic urgency.

懸掛俄羅斯國(guó)旗的油輪“阿納托利·科洛德金”號(hào)停靠在古巴馬坦薩斯的一處石油碼頭。圖源：美聯(lián)社。

同樣的邏輯并不止于歐洲。委內(nèi)瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗以及霍爾木茲海峽，并不是混亂全球圖景中彼此割裂的事件。它們都是一張更大棋盤上的組成部分。在這張棋盤上，對(duì)化石資源及其運(yùn)輸通道的控制仍然至關(guān)重要，因?yàn)殛P(guān)鍵競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，尤其是中國(guó)，依然依賴這些資源和通道。

The same logic extends beyond Europe. Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz are not disconnected episodes in a chaotic global landscape. They are parts of a wider chessboard in which control over fossil resources and routes continues to matter because key rivals, especially China, still depend on them.

中國(guó)或許正在可再生能源領(lǐng)域快速推進(jìn)，但它并未擺脫化石能源層面的脆弱性。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)仍然需要大量進(jìn)口石油和天然氣，其中相當(dāng)一部分要經(jīng)過(guò)存在爭(zhēng)議的空間，或來(lái)自政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的產(chǎn)油國(guó)。這就為一種戰(zhàn)略打開了空間：對(duì)不可再生能源來(lái)源和運(yùn)輸通道的主導(dǎo)，不僅服務(wù)于傳統(tǒng)能源安全目標(biāo)，也服務(wù)于更廣泛的目標(biāo)，即限制中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略回旋余地。

China may be advancing rapidly in renewables, but it has not escaped fossil vulnerability. Its economy still requires substantial imported oil and gas, much of it moving through contested spaces or politically exposed producers. This creates an opening for a strategy in which dominance over non-renewable energy sources and transport corridors serves not only traditional energy security goals, but the broader objective of constraining China’s room for maneuver.

正因如此，當(dāng)前能源秩序不能被描述為舊模式與新模式之間的中性共存。它正越來(lái)越成為一個(gè)對(duì)抗場(chǎng)域。一邊是轉(zhuǎn)型邏輯，中國(guó)試圖在下一輪能源時(shí)代的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施中獲取優(yōu)勢(shì)；另一邊則是一種仍然從化石能源控制、海上監(jiān)督、地區(qū)壓力點(diǎn)以及既有國(guó)際體系維護(hù)中汲取力量的戰(zhàn)略反射。在這一國(guó)際體系中，能源依賴仍然可以被轉(zhuǎn)化為地緣政治杠桿。二者并不是在和平地并行展開，而是在圍繞未來(lái)的規(guī)則和條件展開競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

This is why the current energy order cannot be described as a neutral coexistence between an old model and a new one. It is increasingly a field of confrontation. On one side stands the logic of transition, with China seeking advantage in the infrastructure of the next energy era. On the other stands a strategic reflex that continues to draw power from fossil control, maritime oversight, regional pressure points, and the preservation of an international system in which energy dependence can still be converted into geopolitical leverage. The two are not peacefully unfolding in parallel. They are competing over the terms of the future.

在這場(chǎng)對(duì)抗中，歐洲處于一種不安的位置。它既是能源不安全的受害者，有時(shí)又在無(wú)意中參與了化石燃料—安全秩序的再生產(chǎn)。失去俄羅斯能源供應(yīng)，戲劇性地暴露出歐洲對(duì)可靠能源的強(qiáng)烈需求。這使歐洲在努力把自身塑造為全球氣候領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的同時(shí)，更容易受到外部沖擊影響，也更依賴替代性的化石燃料安排。歐洲或許使用的是綠色轉(zhuǎn)型的話語(yǔ)，但其在能源短缺和價(jià)格波動(dòng)面前的結(jié)構(gòu)性脆弱，仍不斷將其拉回眼前供應(yīng)安全的緊迫要求之中。這樣一來(lái)，它反而強(qiáng)化了這樣一種地緣政治環(huán)境：可再生能源雄心被置于化石燃料必要性之下。

Europe occupies an uneasy place within this confrontation. It is at once a victim of energy insecurity and, at times, an inadvertent participant in the reproduction of the fossil-security order. Its thirst for reliable energy, exposed dramatically by the loss of Russian supply. This has made it more vulnerable to external shocks and more dependent on alternative fossil arrangements precisely at the moment when it seeks to present itself as a global climate leader. Europe may speak the language of green transformation, but its structural exposure to energy scarcity and price volatility continues to pull it back toward the imperatives of immediate supply. In doing so, it reinforces the very geopolitical environment in which renewable ambition is subordinated to fossil necessity.

其結(jié)果，是一種高度不穩(wěn)定的全球狀態(tài)。氣候變化要求加速脫碳，但圍繞能源展開的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，卻正在推動(dòng)主要大國(guó)和脆弱地區(qū)采取維持化石燃料重要性的策略。這是一場(chǎng)地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，在其中，對(duì)能源的控制仍然與爭(zhēng)奪戰(zhàn)略主導(dǎo)權(quán)密不可分。

The result is a deeply unstable global condition. Climate change demands accelerated decarbonization, yet the rivalry surrounding energy is pushing major powers and vulnerable regions toward strategies that preserve fossil relevance: a geopolitical contest in which control over energy remains inseparable from the struggle for strategic dominance.

那么，真正的危險(xiǎn)并不只是氣候行動(dòng)停滯不前，而是氣候行動(dòng)已經(jīng)進(jìn)入一個(gè)權(quán)力劇場(chǎng)：能源轉(zhuǎn)型正越來(lái)越多地被地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)所塑造、延宕和扭曲。

The real danger, then, is not just climate inaction. It is that climate action has entered a theater of power in which energy transition is increasingly shaped, delayed, and distorted by geopolitical competition.

波斯灣戰(zhàn)事已經(jīng)引發(fā)歐洲地圖的能源危機(jī)。圖源：AI生成圖片

歐洲、烏克蘭、霍爾木茲與化石燃料—安全棋盤

Europe, Ukraine, Hormuz, and the Fossil-Security Chessboard

如果說(shuō)上一部分揭示了能源轉(zhuǎn)型與地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)之間的戰(zhàn)略碰撞，那么下一步就需要觀察這種碰撞如何在具體危機(jī)場(chǎng)域中展開。這一矛盾已經(jīng)不再抽象。它體現(xiàn)在烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之中，體現(xiàn)在委內(nèi)瑞拉和伊拉克戰(zhàn)略重要性的重新上升之中，體現(xiàn)在圍繞伊朗的持續(xù)動(dòng)蕩之中，尤其體現(xiàn)在霍爾木茲海峽等咽喉要道的持續(xù)中心地位之中。這些案例共同表明，盡管“轉(zhuǎn)型”話語(yǔ)日益高漲，全球能源體系仍然深深受制于化石燃料控制的政治邏輯。

If the preceding section identified the strategic collision between energy transition and geopolitical rivalry, the next step is to observe how that collision is being played out across concrete theaters of crisis. The contradiction is no longer abstract. It is visible in the war in Ukraine, in the renewed strategic relevance of Venezuela and Iraq, in the persistent volatility surrounding Iran, and above all in the continued centrality of chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. Together, these cases reveal that the global energy system remains deeply structured by the politics of fossil control, even as the language of transition grows louder.

歐洲尋找能源供應(yīng)的過(guò)程，成為更廣泛地強(qiáng)化化石燃料—安全秩序的一部分。液化天然氣被賦予更高的戰(zhàn)略重要性，外部供應(yīng)方獲得了新的杠桿，原本以臨時(shí)必要性為理由建設(shè)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，也開始產(chǎn)生更長(zhǎng)期的影響。表面上看，這些措施是應(yīng)急反應(yīng)；但在氣候危機(jī)要求更堅(jiān)決擺脫化石燃料之際，它們也產(chǎn)生了維持化石能源依賴的效果。歐洲并沒(méi)有放棄轉(zhuǎn)型，但轉(zhuǎn)型被迫與一種安全恐慌共存，而這種恐慌強(qiáng)化的，恰恰是歐洲原本應(yīng)當(dāng)逃離的舊體系。

Europe’s search for supply became part of a wider reinforcement of the fossil-security order. Liquefied natural gas assumed greater strategic importance. External suppliers acquired new leverage. Infrastructure once justified as temporary necessity began to generate longer-term implications. What was presented as an emergency response also had the effect of preserving fossil dependence at the very moment when the climate crisis required sharper departure from it. Europe did not abandon the transition, but the transition was forced to coexist with a security panic that strengthened the old system from which it was supposed to be escaping.

這一發(fā)展本身的意義并不局限于歐洲。歐洲對(duì)能源的迫切需求并不是孤立存在的；它會(huì)傳導(dǎo)至全球市場(chǎng)，并加劇圍繞稀缺供應(yīng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。它還幫助正當(dāng)化了一種更廣泛的政治敘事，即把化石燃料擴(kuò)張辯護(hù)為應(yīng)對(duì)不穩(wěn)定局勢(shì)的理性選擇。

That development matters beyond Europe itself. Europe’s energy thirst does not operate in isolation; it reverberates through global markets and deepens competition for scarce supply. It also helps legitimize a wider political narrative in which fossil expansion is defended as a rational answer to instability.

從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，歐洲既是地緣政治能源擾動(dòng)的受害者，也是化石燃料—安全邏輯再生產(chǎn)的參與者。歐洲越是不安全，就越會(huì)強(qiáng)化碳?xì)淠茉础⒑竭\(yùn)路線和外部供應(yīng)方在全球?qū)用娴闹匾浴６@種邏輯越是得到強(qiáng)化，就越難以把氣候轉(zhuǎn)型作為國(guó)際能源政策中壓倒一切的組織原則。

In this sense, Europe becomes both a casualty of geopolitical energy disruption and a participant in the reproduction of the fossil-security logic. The more insecure Europe becomes, the more it reinforces the global importance of hydrocarbons, shipping routes, and external suppliers. And the more that logic is reinforced, the harder it becomes to treat climate transition as the overriding organizing principle of international energy policy.

烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)還在第二層意義上改變了戰(zhàn)略地圖。它再次證明，能源始終與脅迫、聯(lián)盟管理和全球權(quán)力站隊(duì)密不可分。能源并不僅僅是沖突的后果；它本身就是沖突運(yùn)行的場(chǎng)域之一。對(duì)供應(yīng)的控制、制裁、價(jià)格沖擊以及替代供應(yīng)格局，都成為這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)向戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)之外輻射影響的工具。也正因如此，能源轉(zhuǎn)型不能被視為一個(gè)純粹技術(shù)性或環(huán)境性的問(wèn)題。只要能源體系仍然容易受到地緣政治斷裂的沖擊，各國(guó)政府就會(huì)繼續(xù)優(yōu)先選擇那些它們認(rèn)為可以被保障、被控制，或受到軍事保護(hù)的供應(yīng)形式。

The war in Ukraine also altered the strategic map in a second sense. It reaffirmed that energy remains inseparable from coercion, alliance management, and global power alignment. Energy is not merely a consequence of conflict; it is one of its operating terrains. Control over supply, sanctions, price shocks, and substitution patterns all became tools through which the war radiated beyond the battlefield. This is precisely why the transition cannot be treated as a purely technical or environmental matter. As long as energy systems remain vulnerable to geopolitical rupture, governments will continue to privilege forms of supply they believe can be secured, controlled, or militarily protected.

同樣的邏輯也可以在西半球看到。委內(nèi)瑞拉長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)在華盛頓被視為政治上高度敏感的對(duì)象，但每當(dāng)供應(yīng)形勢(shì)趨緊，或地緣政治靈活性變得有用時(shí)，它又會(huì)周期性地重新進(jìn)入戰(zhàn)略計(jì)算之中。這并不是一個(gè)偶然的矛盾。它揭示出，當(dāng)化石能源重新獲得緊迫性時(shí)，規(guī)范性話語(yǔ)可以多么迅速地被重新校準(zhǔn)。

That same logic is visible in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela, long treated as politically radioactive in Washington, periodically re-enters strategic calculation whenever supply conditions tighten or geopolitical flexibility becomes useful. This is not an incidental contradiction. It reveals how quickly normative language can be recalibrated when fossil energy regains urgency.

一個(gè)受到制裁的產(chǎn)油國(guó)，可能突然再次變得重要，并不是因?yàn)槠渲卫頎顩r發(fā)生了根本變化，而是因?yàn)槠滟Y源仍然嵌入全球安全方程之中。同樣，更廣泛的模式也適用于伊拉克。伊拉克的重要性之所以延續(xù)，并不僅僅因?yàn)樗鼡碛心茉磧?chǔ)備，也因?yàn)樗硖幰粋€(gè)能源、安全架構(gòu)和大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)高度交織的地區(qū)。

A sanctioned producer can suddenly become relevant again, not because its governance has fundamentally changed, but because its resources remain embedded in a global security equation. The same broader pattern applies to Iraq, whose importance persists not only because of its reserves, but because it sits within a region where energy, security architecture, and great-power competition remain closely interlinked.

因霍爾木茲海峽封閉，伊拉克石油出口受阻，經(jīng)敘利亞轉(zhuǎn)運(yùn)出海成為替代方案之一。圖源：路透社

伊朗則進(jìn)一步凸顯了這一圖景。很少有案例能像伊朗這樣清楚地說(shuō)明，化石能源、戰(zhàn)略地理與地緣政治對(duì)抗依然緊密交織在一起。伊朗之所以重要，不僅因?yàn)槠鋼碛刑細(xì)滟Y源，也因?yàn)樗幍奈恢茫约八軌蛲{的對(duì)象。霍爾木茲海峽并不只是一個(gè)狹窄的海上通道，它是全球化石能源經(jīng)濟(jì)的動(dòng)脈之一。那里任何不穩(wěn)定，都將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出海灣地區(qū)本身，影響亞洲、歐洲和美國(guó)的能源價(jià)格、市場(chǎng)心理、保險(xiǎn)成本、航運(yùn)安排和戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃。霍爾木茲正是地理本身轉(zhuǎn)化為杠桿的地方。

Iran sharpens the picture further. Few cases better illustrate how fossil energy, strategic geography, and geopolitical confrontation remain fused. Iran matters not only because of its hydrocarbons, but because of where it sits and what it can threaten. The Strait of Hormuz is not simply a narrow maritime corridor. It is one of the arteries of the global fossil economy. Any instability there reverberates far beyond the Gulf, affecting prices, market psychology, insurance costs, shipping calculations, and strategic planning across Asia, Europe, and the United States. Hormuz is where geography itself becomes leverage.

這一點(diǎn)對(duì)于中國(guó)而言尤其重要。中國(guó)在可再生能源和電氣化領(lǐng)域的推進(jìn)，并沒(méi)有消除其對(duì)進(jìn)口化石燃料的持續(xù)需求。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的規(guī)模仍然需要大量石油和天然氣投入，其中相當(dāng)一部分暴露在海上運(yùn)輸路線和政治不穩(wěn)定地區(qū)之中。這意味著，全球向可再生能源轉(zhuǎn)型，并未消解化石能源咽喉要道的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值。相反，這些咽喉要道仍然是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手計(jì)算壓力、暴露程度和約束能力的工具。在這樣一個(gè)世界里，正因?yàn)樾履茉粗刃蛏形赐耆纬桑瑢?duì)舊能源秩序的控制才依然具有巨大意義。

This is especially significant in relation to China. China’s advance in renewable energy and electrification does not eliminate its continued need for imported fossil fuel. Its economic scale still requires substantial oil and gas inputs, much of them exposed to maritime routes and politically unstable regions. That means the global shift toward renewables has not yet dissolved the strategic value of fossil chokepoints. On the contrary, these chokepoints remain instruments through which rivals can calculate pressure, exposure, and constraint. In such a world, control over the old energy order retains immense relevance precisely because the new one is not yet complete.

由此浮現(xiàn)出來(lái)的，已經(jīng)不只是一組地區(qū)危機(jī)，而是一張棋盤。在這張棋盤上，不同危機(jī)場(chǎng)域服務(wù)于一種共同的戰(zhàn)略功能。烏克蘭暴露了能源依賴型歐洲的脆弱性，并重新激活了應(yīng)急化石能源供應(yīng)的政治邏輯；委內(nèi)瑞拉提醒人們，資源獲取可以迅速壓倒政治一致性；伊拉克則表明，那些不穩(wěn)定但不可或缺的產(chǎn)油國(guó)仍然具有持續(xù)重要性；伊朗和霍爾木茲則揭示，海上咽喉要道仍然是管理全球能源不安全的核心環(huán)節(jié)。在這些案例中，同一種模式反復(fù)出現(xiàn)：每當(dāng)能源安全變得緊迫，化石能源體系便重新獲得戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)先地位，而氣候邏輯則被推到一旁。

What emerges, then, is something more than a set of regional crises. It is a chessboard on which different theaters serve a common strategic function. Ukraine exposes the vulnerability of energy-dependent Europe and revives the politics of emergency fossil supply. Venezuela reminds us that resource access can quickly override political consistency. Iraq demonstrates the continued relevance of unstable but indispensable producers. Iran and Hormuz reveal that maritime chokepoints remain central to the management of global energy insecurity. Across these cases, the same pattern recurs: whenever energy security becomes urgent, fossil systems regain strategic primacy, and climate logic is pushed to the side.

其后果令人警醒。每一次新的地緣政治沖擊，都會(huì)強(qiáng)化這樣一種主張：必須保護(hù)供應(yīng)、實(shí)現(xiàn)進(jìn)口多元化、擴(kuò)大能源戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備、保障運(yùn)輸通道，并鞏固舊有能源伙伴關(guān)系。然而，這些措施雖然在眼前安全邏輯下具有合理性，卻也延長(zhǎng)了氣候行動(dòng)被置于次要位置的條件。世界由此陷入一種反復(fù)循環(huán)：地緣政治危機(jī)重新喚起化石燃料的緊迫性；化石燃料的緊迫性延緩或稀釋能源轉(zhuǎn)型；被延緩的轉(zhuǎn)型加深氣候不穩(wěn)定；而氣候不穩(wěn)定又反過(guò)來(lái)加劇對(duì)能源安全的爭(zhēng)奪。

The consequence is sobering. Every new geopolitical shock strengthens the argument for protecting supply, diversifying imports, expanding strategic reserves, securing routes, and reinforcing old energy partnerships. But these measures, while rational within the logic of immediate security, also prolong the conditions under which climate action becomes secondary. The world becomes trapped in a repeating cycle: geopolitical crisis revives fossil urgency; fossil urgency delays or dilutes transition; delayed transition deepens climate instability; and climate instability, in turn, intensifies the scramble for secure energy.

從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，歐洲、烏克蘭、委內(nèi)瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗和霍爾木茲，并不是世界政治中彼此分離的章節(jié)。它們是同一個(gè)未解現(xiàn)實(shí)相互關(guān)聯(lián)的表現(xiàn)：國(guó)際體系仍在通過(guò)那些正在制造全球性不安全的結(jié)構(gòu)來(lái)尋求安全。只要這一矛盾沒(méi)有被直接面對(duì)，能源安全就會(huì)繼續(xù)在地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中被重新定義，而能源轉(zhuǎn)型也將始終處于脆弱狀態(tài)。這種脆弱并不只是因?yàn)槟芰Σ蛔慊蛘我庠覆粔颍且驗(yàn)檠泳彵旧砜赡芫哂袘?zhàn)略價(jià)值。

In this sense, Europe, Ukraine, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and Hormuz are not separate chapters of world politics. They are interconnected expressions of the same unresolved reality: the international system still seeks security through structures that are helping to produce planetary insecurity. Until that contradiction is addressed directly, energy security will continue to be redefined through geopolitical rivalry, and the transition will remain vulnerable, not simply because of insufficient capacity or inadequate political will, but because delay itself may carry strategic value.

能源轉(zhuǎn)型的延遲，并不只是推遲氣候目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)；它也會(huì)延后中國(guó)在未來(lái)能源產(chǎn)業(yè)中崛起所帶來(lái)的地緣政治收益。從這一角度看，轉(zhuǎn)型過(guò)程中的延宕或擾亂，可能具有戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值；而以化石燃料為基礎(chǔ)的舊秩序延續(xù)，對(duì)美國(guó)而言也不只是發(fā)揮防御性作用。通過(guò)延長(zhǎng)石油、天然氣和關(guān)鍵咽喉要道的中心地位，它不僅可能維持美國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略杠桿，也可能減緩中國(guó)將其在可再生能源領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)先地位轉(zhuǎn)化為更廣泛結(jié)構(gòu)性權(quán)力的能力。

A delayed energy transition does not simply defer climate goals; it also postpones the geopolitical benefits of China’s rise in future energy industries. From this perspective, delay or disruption within the transition may carry strategic value, while the persistence of the fossil-based order can serve more than a defensive role for the United States. By prolonging the centrality of oil, gas, and key chokepoints, it may not only sustain U.S. strategic leverage but also slow China’s ability to convert its leadership in renewables into broader structural power.

從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，能源轉(zhuǎn)型的延遲不僅是氣候行動(dòng)上的挫折，也可能成為一種戰(zhàn)略性推遲機(jī)制，用以延緩中國(guó)在新興能源秩序中的上升。

In this sense, a delayed transition is not only a climate setback; it may also function as a strategic deferral of China’s ascent in the emerging energy order.

氣候變化與權(quán)力重組

Climate Change and the Reordering of Power

在這場(chǎng)不斷展開的能源危機(jī)中，最終攸關(guān)的并不只是脫碳的速度，甚至也不只是單獨(dú)意義上的全球氣候穩(wěn)定。更根本的是，世界正在進(jìn)入這樣一個(gè)時(shí)期：氣候變化、能源轉(zhuǎn)型與地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，正匯聚為一場(chǎng)圍繞未來(lái)權(quán)力分配的斗爭(zhēng)。這正是當(dāng)前時(shí)刻具有歷史分量的原因所在。問(wèn)題不再只是世界能否足夠迅速地從化石燃料轉(zhuǎn)向可再生能源，而是這種轉(zhuǎn)型能否在不動(dòng)搖現(xiàn)有國(guó)際秩序長(zhǎng)期依賴的戰(zhàn)略等級(jí)結(jié)構(gòu)的情況下發(fā)生。

What is ultimately at stake in this unfolding energy crisis is not only the pace of decarbonization, nor even the stability of the global climate taken in isolation. More fundamentally, the world is entering a period in which climate change, energy transition, and geopolitical rivalry are converging into a single struggle over the future distribution of power. This is what gives the current moment its historic weight. The question is no longer simply whether the world can move from fossil fuels to renewable energy quickly enough. It is whether such a transition can occur without destabilizing the strategic hierarchies on which the existing international order has long depended.

正因如此，這一問(wèn)題不能被簡(jiǎn)單歸結(jié)為通常意義上的政治意愿不足。障礙要深得多。氣候行動(dòng)正在同根深蒂固的優(yōu)勢(shì)體系發(fā)生碰撞。舊能源秩序并不只是為工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)提供動(dòng)力；它還支撐著聯(lián)盟體系、軍事投射、貿(mào)易路線、金融影響力和地緣政治依附關(guān)系。它塑造了一個(gè)可以通過(guò)控制開采、定價(jià)、供應(yīng)、保護(hù)和準(zhǔn)入來(lái)行使權(quán)力的世界。因此，擺脫這一秩序并不只是采用更清潔的技術(shù)，而是動(dòng)搖現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)略權(quán)力的一項(xiàng)物質(zhì)基礎(chǔ)。

This is why the problem cannot be reduced to a failure of political will in the ordinary sense. The obstacles are deeper. Climate action is colliding with entrenched systems of advantage. The old energy order did not merely power industrial economies; it underpinned alliances, military reach, trade routes, financial influence, and geopolitical dependency. It created a world in which power could be exercised through control over extraction, pricing, supply, protection, and access. To move away from that order is therefore not simply to adopt cleaner technologies. It is to unsettle one of the material foundations of modern strategic power.

中國(guó)在這場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)型中的作用至關(guān)重要。中國(guó)在可再生能源、電池、電動(dòng)汽車、電網(wǎng)技術(shù)以及產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)模方面的快速推進(jìn)，使其所處位置已經(jīng)超出了單純經(jīng)濟(jì)層面的意義。中國(guó)已經(jīng)接近那些可能定義下一輪能源發(fā)展時(shí)代的關(guān)鍵產(chǎn)業(yè)制高點(diǎn)。

China’s role in this transformation is central. Its rapid advance in renewable energy, batteries, electric vehicles, grid technology, and industrial scale has given it a position that extends beyond economics. Ithas placed China near the commanding heights of sectors likely to define the next era of energy development.

中國(guó)中南部的一座電力傳輸樞紐，它是全球最長(zhǎng)、最強(qiáng)的特高壓輸電線路的終點(diǎn)。圖源：紐約時(shí)報(bào)

這并不意味著中國(guó)已經(jīng)擺脫矛盾，也不意味著中國(guó)的能源體系已經(jīng)進(jìn)入“后化石燃料”階段。但它確實(shí)意味著，如果全球能源轉(zhuǎn)型加速推進(jìn)，結(jié)構(gòu)性優(yōu)勢(shì)就可能逐步轉(zhuǎn)向那些在電氣化產(chǎn)業(yè)中占據(jù)更有利位置的行為體，而不再主要掌握在舊有碳?xì)淠茉粗鲗?dǎo)架構(gòu)中的優(yōu)勢(shì)方手中。

This does not mean that China has escaped contradiction, nor that its energy system is already post-fossil. But it does mean that the transition, if accelerated globally, could gradually shift structural advantage toward actors that are better positioned in the industries of electrification than in the older architecture of hydrocarbon dominance.

對(duì)美國(guó)而言，在一定程度上，對(duì)其他那些形成于化石能源時(shí)代地緣政治邏輯之中的大國(guó)而言，這就造成了一種深刻的戰(zhàn)略困境。原則上支持快速脫碳是一回事；接受一場(chǎng)可能重新分配產(chǎn)業(yè)、技術(shù)和地緣政治優(yōu)勢(shì)的轉(zhuǎn)型，則是另一回事。

For the United States, and to some extent for other powers formed within the geopolitical logic of the fossil age, this creates a profound strategic dilemma. To support rapid decarbonization in principle is one thing. To accept a transition that may redistribute industrial, technological, and geopolitical advantage is another.

這正是氣候政策常常在話語(yǔ)上得到擁抱、卻在戰(zhàn)略上受到約束的更深層原因。阻力并不總是公開的，也并不總是意識(shí)形態(tài)化的。它往往表現(xiàn)為拖延、觀望、泛安全化、附條件承諾，或重新強(qiáng)調(diào)化石能源體系的韌性。但其累積效果是相同的：能源轉(zhuǎn)型被放緩，并不只是因?yàn)樗旧砝щy重重，也因?yàn)樗坏┏晒Γ赡芤阅承┬袨轶w并不愿完全接受的方式改變權(quán)力平衡。

This is the deeper reason why climate policy so often appears rhetorically embraced yet strategically constrained. Resistance is not always open, nor always ideological. Often it appears in the form of delay, hedging, securitization, conditional commitment, or renewed emphasis on fossil resilience. But the cumulative effect is the same: the transition is slowed not only because it is difficult, but because its success may alter the balance of power in ways that some actors are unwilling fully to accept.

正是在這里，氣候問(wèn)題與全球秩序問(wèn)題變得不可分割。如果世界主要由科學(xué)必要性來(lái)支配，那么脫碳的邏輯早已勢(shì)不可擋。物理證據(jù)清晰明確，技術(shù)路徑也越來(lái)越可行，不作為的代價(jià)還在持續(xù)上升。然而，當(dāng)前的國(guó)際體系并不只按照科學(xué)邏輯運(yùn)行。它還在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、不對(duì)稱、不安全感以及維護(hù)相對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)的邏輯中運(yùn)行。氣候科學(xué)可以界定問(wèn)題的緊迫性，卻無(wú)法決定政治選擇的優(yōu)先次序。這些選擇仍然要經(jīng)過(guò)國(guó)家持久戰(zhàn)略計(jì)算的過(guò)濾；各國(guó)追問(wèn)的不只是“什么是必要的”，還有“誰(shuí)會(huì)獲益、誰(shuí)會(huì)受損、誰(shuí)來(lái)主導(dǎo)”。

This is where the climate question becomes inseparable from the question of global order. If the world were governed primarily by scientific necessity, the logic of decarbonization would already be overwhelming. The physical evidence is clear, the technological pathways are increasingly available, and the costs of inaction continue to mount. Yet the international system at this point, does not operate on scientific logic alone. It operates through competition, asymmetry, insecurity, and the preservation of relative advantage. Climate science may define the urgency of the problem, but it does not determine the hierarchy of political choices. Those choices are filtered through the enduring calculations of states that still ask not only what is necessary, but who gains, who loses, and who leads.

從這一角度看，最大的危險(xiǎn)或許并不是傳統(tǒng)意義上對(duì)氣候變化的否認(rèn)，而是這樣一個(gè)世界的出現(xiàn)：氣候擾動(dòng)被充分承認(rèn)，卻仍然從屬于戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。在這樣的世界里，各國(guó)政府可能會(huì)投資于氣候適應(yīng)、綠色技術(shù)、韌性建設(shè)和選擇性脫碳，同時(shí)在化石燃料杠桿仍具有地緣政治效用的地方繼續(xù)加以保留。其結(jié)果是在一個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性體系中采取碎片化行動(dòng)；在這個(gè)體系中，國(guó)家優(yōu)勢(shì)受到的保護(hù)，比地球穩(wěn)定本身更為堅(jiān)決。這是一種更隱蔽、也可能更持久的失敗形式。

Seen in this light, the greatest danger may not be denial of climate change in the traditional sense. It may be the emergence of a world in which climate disruption is fully acknowledged, yet still subordinated to strategic rivalry. In such a world, governments may invest in adaptation, green technology, resilience, and selective decarbonization, while continuing to preserve fossil leverage wherever it remains geopolitically useful. The result would not be total inaction. It would be fragmented action within a competitive system that protects national advantage more fiercely than planetary stability.That is a far more subtle and perhaps more durable form of failure.

歐洲的位置再次說(shuō)明了這種緊張關(guān)系。歐洲試圖在氣候規(guī)范和監(jiān)管雄心方面發(fā)揮引領(lǐng)作用，但其能源不安全又反復(fù)將其拉回供應(yīng)依賴和地緣政治脆弱性的嚴(yán)峻現(xiàn)實(shí)之中。中國(guó)試圖在未來(lái)產(chǎn)業(yè)中取得領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，卻仍然暴露在化石燃料瓶頸和海上風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之下。美國(guó)推動(dòng)清潔創(chuàng)新，卻仍然從一個(gè)碳?xì)淠茉础⒅撇谩⒑Ｉ贤ǖ篮彤a(chǎn)油國(guó)影響力依舊居于中心的世界中獲得戰(zhàn)略收益。

Europe’s position once again illustrates this tension. It seeks to lead on climate norms and regulatory ambition, yet its energy insecurity repeatedly pulls it back into the hard realities of supply dependence and geopolitical vulnerability. China seeks leadership in the industries of the future, yet remains exposed to fossil bottlenecks and maritime risk. The United States promotes clean innovation, yet continues to derive strategic benefit from a world in which hydrocarbons, sanctions, sea lanes, and producer influence remain central.

因此，每一個(gè)主要行為體都被困在一種矛盾之中：一邊是它所宣示的能源未來(lái)，另一邊是它仍然身處其中的戰(zhàn)略現(xiàn)實(shí)。相應(yīng)地，氣候危機(jī)已經(jīng)不再只是排放問(wèn)題，也關(guān)乎新能源秩序?qū)⒃诤畏N政治條件下被建立起來(lái)。Each major actor is therefore caught in a contradiction between the energy future it proclaims and the strategic present it still inhabits. Accordingly, the climate crisis is no longer only about emissions, it is also about the political terms under which a new energy order will be built.

挑戰(zhàn)并不只是加快能源轉(zhuǎn)型，而是防止轉(zhuǎn)型被大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)所驅(qū)動(dòng)。如果可再生能源淪為又一個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)場(chǎng)域，脫碳進(jìn)程就可能以不均衡且過(guò)于緩慢的方式推進(jìn)，難以遏制不斷升級(jí)的全球性動(dòng)蕩。相反，如果能源轉(zhuǎn)型不被理解為一場(chǎng)零和式的權(quán)力轉(zhuǎn)移，而是被視為構(gòu)建更穩(wěn)定國(guó)際秩序的基礎(chǔ)，它就可能為擺脫“化石燃料—安全陷阱”提供一條出路。然而，要實(shí)現(xiàn)這一結(jié)果，需要一種當(dāng)前仍然匱乏的政治想象力。

The challenge is not just to accelerate the transition, but to prevent it from being driven by rivalry. If renewable energy becomes another arena of competition, decarbonization may proceed unevenly and too slowly to limit escalating global disruption. If, instead, the transition is framed not as a zero-sum shift in power but as the foundation of a more stable international order, it could offer a way out of the fossil-security trap. That outcome, however, demands a level of political imagination that is currently lacking.

因此，氣候變化危機(jī)與秩序危機(jī)已經(jīng)不可分割。舊有化石燃料體系在環(huán)境上不可持續(xù)，而新的能源體系尚未完全形成，就已經(jīng)在地緣政治上陷入爭(zhēng)奪。二者之間，正是我們這個(gè)時(shí)代的核心斗爭(zhēng)：人類究竟能否建設(shè)一個(gè)由地球整體必要性所指引的能源未來(lái)，還是說(shuō)，這一未來(lái)將被一個(gè)碎片化世界中的種種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)所扭曲、延宕，并被武器化。

The crisis of climate change is therefore inseparable from a crisis of order. The old fossil system is environmentally unsustainable, yet the new energy system is geopolitically contested before it is fully formed. Between the two lies the central struggle of our time: whether humanity can build an energy future guided by planetary necessity, or whether that future will be distorted, delayed, and weaponized by the rivalries of a fractured world.

圖源：路透社

結(jié)論

Conclusion

氣候危機(jī)常常被表述為一個(gè)科學(xué)、技術(shù)和政治意愿問(wèn)題。但這種框架已經(jīng)不再充分。本文所要論證的是，氣候變化如今已經(jīng)置身于一場(chǎng)更大范圍的地緣政治斗爭(zhēng)之中，這場(chǎng)斗爭(zhēng)圍繞能源、權(quán)力和戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢(shì)展開。向可再生能源的轉(zhuǎn)型，并不是在一個(gè)中性的政策空間中展開的。它發(fā)生在一個(gè)碎片化的國(guó)際體系之中，在這個(gè)體系中，各國(guó)繼續(xù)計(jì)算的不僅是環(huán)境必要性，還有相對(duì)收益、依賴關(guān)系、杠桿和控制權(quán)。

The climate crisis is often presented as a problem of science, technology, and political will. But that framing is no longer sufficient. What this article has argued is that climate change now sits inside a much larger geopolitical struggle over energy, power, and strategic advantage. The transition to renewable energy is not unfolding in a neutral policy space. It is taking place in a fractured international system in which states continue to calculate not only environmental necessity, but also relative gain, dependency, leverage, and control.

這正是能源安全與氣候行動(dòng)之間的矛盾變得如此尖銳的原因。問(wèn)題并不只是各國(guó)政府未能按照氣候科學(xué)的要求一以貫之地行動(dòng)，而是現(xiàn)有能源秩序仍然提供著主要大國(guó)不愿放棄的戰(zhàn)略收益。化石燃料依然同軍事投射、制裁、咽喉要道、聯(lián)盟體系和影響力網(wǎng)絡(luò)相聯(lián)系。相比之下，可再生能源則指向產(chǎn)業(yè)和地緣政治優(yōu)勢(shì)的重新分配；在新興能源經(jīng)濟(jì)的關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域中，中國(guó)已經(jīng)取得了顯著領(lǐng)先。

That is why the contradiction between energy security and climate action has become so acute. The issue is not merely that governments fail to act consistently on what climate science requires. It is that the existing energy order still provides strategic benefits that major powers are reluctant to surrender. Fossil fuels remain tied to military reach, sanctions, chokepoints, alliances, and systems of influence. Renewable energy, by contrast, points toward a redistribution of industrial and geopolitical advantage, one in which China has already secured a significant lead in key sectors of the emerging energy economy.

從這一角度看，氣候行動(dòng)的延宕并不總是無(wú)知、否認(rèn)或制度乏力的產(chǎn)物。它也可能反映出一種更深層的戰(zhàn)略邏輯：維護(hù)一種仍在服務(wù)地緣政治目的的能源架構(gòu)，哪怕這種架構(gòu)正在加劇生態(tài)不穩(wěn)定。本文所考察的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、危機(jī)和壓力點(diǎn)——無(wú)論是烏克蘭、委內(nèi)瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗、霍爾木茲，還是歐洲的能源脆弱性——都不是氣候敘事邊緣的孤立擾動(dòng)。它們本身就是氣候敘事的一部分。它們揭示出這樣一個(gè)世界：國(guó)際體系仍在通過(guò)那些正在加劇地球不安全的結(jié)構(gòu)來(lái)尋求安全。

From this perspective, climate delay is not always the product of ignorance, denial, or institutional weakness alone. It can also reflect a deeper strategic logic: the preservation of an energy architecture that continues to serve geopolitical purposes even as it drives ecological instability. The wars, crises, and pressure points examined in this article be it Ukraine, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Hormuz, and Europe’s energy vulnerability, are not separate disturbances on the margins of the climate story. They are part of the climate story. They reveal a world still seeking security through the very structures that are worsening planetary insecurity.

這才是真正的危險(xiǎn)。能源轉(zhuǎn)型或許會(huì)繼續(xù)推進(jìn)，但可能以一種被扭曲的形式推進(jìn)：被競(jìng)爭(zhēng)拖慢，被不安全感碎片化，并從屬于大國(guó)博弈的棋局。在這樣的世界里，脫碳并不會(huì)停止，但它不再主要由科學(xué)緊迫性所支配。相反，它會(huì)被卷入一場(chǎng)關(guān)于誰(shuí)將塑造下一輪能源秩序、誰(shuí)將主導(dǎo)其戰(zhàn)略后果的斗爭(zhēng)之中。

This is the real danger. The transition may continue, but in a distorted form: slowed by rivalry, fragmented by insecurity, and subordinated to the chess game of great-power competition. In such a world, decarbonization does not stop, but it ceases to be governed primarily by scientific urgency. Instead, it becomes entangled in the struggle over who will shape the next energy order and who will dominate its strategic consequences.

因此，我們這個(gè)時(shí)代的核心問(wèn)題，已經(jīng)不再只是世界是否會(huì)擺脫化石燃料，而是世界能否在轉(zhuǎn)型本身被地緣政治沖突俘獲之前做到這一點(diǎn)。一旦發(fā)生這種情況，氣候變化就不再只是環(huán)境緊急狀態(tài)。它將成為新一輪權(quán)力等級(jí)結(jié)構(gòu)被爭(zhēng)奪和塑造的場(chǎng)域。

The central question of our time, then, is no longer simply whether the world will move beyond fossil fuels. It is whether it can do so before the transition itself is captured by geopolitical conflict. If that happens, climate change will no longer be only an environmental emergency. It will become the terrain on which a new hierarchy of power is fought out.

而這或許正是最殘酷的悖論：人類已經(jīng)知道，為避免更深重的氣候?yàn)?zāi)難必須做什么，卻仍然被困在一個(gè)把生存之路轉(zhuǎn)化為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)工具的國(guó)際體系之中。

And that may be the cruelest paradox of all: that humanity already knows what it must do to avoid deeper climate catastrophe, yet remains trapped in an international system that turns the path to survival into an instrument of rivalry.

梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織下屬國(guó)際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)成員

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of the Advisory Committee of the International Center for Creativity and Sustainable Development under the auspicious of UNESO (ICCSD).

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